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T will be the function of the introductory portion of this symposium
to survey briefly the history and purpose of the attorney-client privi-
lege, with special reference to its availability to corporations. It will sum-
marize some of the existing authorities on this subject to provide a back-
drop for the more practical insights into -the current problems provided
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by the two sections that follow.
Dean Wigmore has tersely sum-
marized the essential requirements
for the attorney-client privilege:
"(1) Where legal advice of any
kind is sought (2) from a profes-
sional legal adviser in his capacity
as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently pro-
tected (7) from disclosure by him-
self or by the legal adviser, (8) ex-
cept the protection be waived."
8 J. WGMORE, EVIDENCE §2292 (Lit-
tle, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass.,
McNaughton rev. 1961).
A more elaborate and somewhat
different formulation is found in
United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.
Mass. 1950).
HISTORY
The attorney-client privilege
seems first to have been recognized
in the 16th century.
Originally, the privilege seemed
to be based upon the honor of
the attorney and belonged to the
attorney, who could waive it. Dur-
ing the 18th century, the courts
found a new rationale in protect-
ing the client from apprehension
that his confidences might be be-
trayed. By the middle of the 19th
century it was recognized that the
privilege belonged to the client.
At first it existed only when a
confidence had been communicated
to a lawyer during litigation. Ulti-
mately it extended to any consulta-
tion for legal advice.
The purpose of the privilege is
expressed well in a comment to the
Model Code of Evidence:
"In a society as complicated in
structure as ours and governed by
laws as complex and detailed as
those imposed upon us, expert legal
advice is essential. To the furnish-
ing of such advice the fullest free-
dom and honesty of communica-
tion of pertinent facts is a prereq-
uisite. To induce clients to make
such communication, the privilege
to prevent their later disclosure is
said by courts and commentators to
be a necessity. The social good de-
rived from the proper performance
of the functions of lawyers acting
for their clients is believed to out-
weigh the harm that may come
from the suppression of the evi-
dence in specific cases." ALI, MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 210, Com-
ment a (1942).
The privilege has undergone peri-
odic attack by academicians of re-
pute-Bentham, Morgan, McCor-
mick, and Radin, to name a few.
But the bar and the bench have
been consistently alert to any at-
tempt to narrow its scope.
APPLICABILITY TO CORPORATIONS
Prior to 1962 there was no case
that denied the availability of the
privilege to a corporation if the
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requirements of the privilege were
met. An impressive line of cases
assumed that a corporation could
assert the privilege.
The American Law Institute's
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE [Rule 209]
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence
[Rule 26(3)] included corporations
in the definition of clients who
could assert the privilege.
Radiant Burners Cases
Hence, two decisions by Chief
Judge Campbell of the Northern
District of Illinois, which denied
the availability of the privilege to
a corporation in the Radiant Burn-
ers cases, came as a considerable
shock to most lawyers who thought
the matter was free from doubt.
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D.
Ill. 1962), 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D.
Ill. 1962).
Chief Judge Campbell reasoned
that:
* Historically the attorney-client
privilege, like the privilege against
self-incrimination, was intended to
be available only to natural persons;
* The essential requirement of con-
fidentiality could not exist within
a corporation, which necessarily
must operate through agents; and
e The visitatorial powers of the state
weaken the bases for the assertion
of the privilege by a corporation.
Reversal
There followed a brief period of
considerable consternation, high-
lighted by a number of highly crit-
ical comments in the law reviews.
The furor subsided, however, when
the Seventh Circuit reversed Radi-
ant Burners [320 F. 2d 314 (1963)].
The opinion made clear what
most observers has assumed previ-
ously-that, unlike the privilege
against self-incrimination, the at-
torney-client privilege does not exist
out of deference to a personal right,
but as a rule to facilitate the work-
ing of justice. Specifically, the
Court held:
"A corporation is entitled to the
same treatment as any other 'client'
-no more and no less. If it seeks
legal advice from an attorney, and
in that relationship confidentially
'communicates information relating
the advice sought, it may protect
itself from disclosure, absent its
waiver hereof." Id. at 324.
There seems little chance that
Chief Judge Campbell's views will
experience a renaissance. However,
Radiant Burners has had a pro-
found influence on the attitude of
courts towards the assertion of the
privilege. The reasons suggested by
Judge Campbell as a basis for his
conclusion that the privilege is
never available to a corporation
have been utilized by other courts
to test the assertion of the privilege
in particular cases.
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There seems to be a clear recog-
nition that the difference between
a corporation and a natural person
affects whether in a given case a
communication can be appropriate-
ly characterized as that of a cor-
poration rather than its agent.
There seems to be little doubt that
the privilege will not be available
to allow a corporation to immunize
its records from disclosure by plac-
ing its papers and documents in the
hands of its lawyers for custodial
purposes. Nor is there any tendency
by the courts to extend the privilege
to business advice simply because
it is given by a lawyer.
TESTS OF APPLICABILITY
The cases provide some illumi-
nating examples of the difficulty in
determining when the privilege
exists.
Communications to Corporate
Agents
An initial question sometimes
involves the issue of whether the
corporation is the client when in-
formation is communicated to a
lawyer by an agent of the corpora-
tion. In some cases, the agent may
be only a witness; in others he may
be speaking as the representative of
the corporation. What test should
be applied to determine whether
the communication is privileged as
to the corporation?
There have been suggestions that
the client is the corporation when-
ever any agent originates a com-
munication for the advice of com-
pany counsel on a matter concern-
ing the interests of the corporation.
See Comment, The Lawyer-Client
Privilege: Its Application to Cor-
porations, the Role of Ethics, and
Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw.
U.L. REv. 235, 242 (1961).
Other decisions would stop short
of all agents, but would clearly per-
mit a fairly broad group to speak
for the corporation. See United
States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., above; Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Radio Corporation of America,
121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del.
1954). Others have suggested that
the test should be whether the
agent's communication related to
his corporate responsibilities. Burn-
ham, Confidentiality and the Cor-
porate Lawyer, 56 ILL. BAR J. 542
(1968).
On occasion it has been suggested
that the rank in the corporation of
the employee making the communi-
cation should be the determinant.
This contention was made in City
of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483,
485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Several courts have formulated a
standard in terms of power to con-
trol. Garrison v. General Motors
Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal.
1963); Day v. Illinois Power Co.,
50 Ill. App. 2d 52 199 N.E. 2d 802
(1964).
In City of Philadelphia v. West-
inghouse Electric Corp., above,
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Judge Kirkpatrick stated the test in
these terms:
"Keeping in mind that the ques-
tion is, Is it the corporation which
is seeking the lawyer's advice when
the asserted privileged communica-
tion is made?, the most satisfactory
solution, I think, is that if the em-
ployee making the communication,
of whatever rank he may be, is in
a position to control or even to take
a substantial part in a decision
about any action which the cor-
poration may take upon the advice
of the attorney, or if he is an au-
thorized member of a body or
group which has the authority,
then, in effect, he is (or personifies)
the corporation when he makes his
disclosure to the lawyer and the
privilege would apply. In all other
cases the employee would be merely
giving information to the lawyer
to enable the latter to advise those
in the corporation having the au-
thority to act or refrain from acting
on the advice." 210 F. Supp. 483,
485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Thus, in a matter of overwhelm-
ing importance to a corporation,
a department or division head
might not be able to speak for the
corporation, while in cases where
an employee is actually authorized
to make a decision after consulta-
tion with counsel-as, for example,
the head of a claims department
dealing with a minor personal in-
jury claim-a communication to an
attorney concerning the matter
would be privileged as to the cor-
poration. Id. at 486.
The statement of an agency out-
side the "control group" would
simply be that of a witness. The
corporation might still resist dis-
covery on the "work product" con-
cept of Hickman v. Taylor [329
U.S. 495 (1947)], but the statement
would not be privileged.
CONTROL GRouP TEST
The "control group test" has been
vigorously criticized. See Burnham,
above, at 545-48; Heininger, The
Attorney-Client Privilege as It Re-
lates to Corporations, 53 ILL. BAR.
J. 376, 384 (1965).
It has been pointed out that the
adoption of such a test may mean
that outside counsel who engages
in internal investigations as a part
of a vigorous program of antitrust
compliance may be developing evi-
dence against a client when he ex-
changes communications with cor-
porate agents who are not within
the control group.
Furthermore, the test seems to
deny the privilege to the corpora-
tion when the communication is
made by middle-management ex-
ecutives who may not qualify for
inclusion in the control group, but
who have responsibilities for mak-
ing recommendations that are fre-
quently ratified perfunctorily by
higher management: See Maurer,
Privileged Communications and the
19
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Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW.
352, 367-69 (1967).
Confidentiality
A second problem deals with the
requirements of confidentiality. A
communication that is not made in
confidence, as when an oral com-
munication is made in the presence
of strangers or a written commu-
nication is distributed generally
throughout a corporation, will not
be privileged.
A corporation must operate
through agents and, therefore, some
agents of the corporations are nec-
essarily privy to any communica-
tion with the attorney for the cor-
poration. However, it does not fol-
low that a communication may be
disclosed indiscriminately within
the corporation and still be pro-
tected.
The best standard seems to recog-
nige that disclosure may be made
within the corporation on a "need
to know" basis without destroying
the privilege. See Comment, 56
Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 248 (1961).
It should, of course, be recog-
nized that a communication that
was originally confidential, and thus
privileged, may lose is status by
subsequently being broadcast to a
larger constituency. Indeed, it has
been held that the privilege may be
lost by filing a document in the
general files of the corporation. See
United States v. Kelsey-Hayes
Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D.
Mich. 1954); Cote v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., 160 Misc. 658, 290 N.Y.
Supp. 483 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1936);
cf. Fey v. Staufler Chem. Co., 19
F.R.D. 526 (D. Neb. 1956).
Nature of Advice
A third problem area involves the
kind of advice that is sought or
given. The privilege applies only
when legal advice is sought from a
professional legal adviser who is
acting in that capacity.
Normally, there is no problem
when the ordinary citizen consults
a lawyer. Frequently, however, law-
yers render commercial and even
technical advice to corporations in
addition to advice concerning the
law.
Thus, it is sometimes necessary
for the courts to characterize a com-
munication as one seeking or pro-
viding business advice, and thus not
privileged, or one seeking legal ad-
vice and, therefore, within the pro-
tection of the privilege. See United
States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd.,
52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943).
Frequently, however, the advice
of a lawyer may involve mixed
legal-business advice. As Judge
Wysanski has pointed out:
"The modern lawyer almost in-
variably advises his client upon not
only what is permissible but also
what is desirable. And it is in the
public interest that the lawyei
should regard himself as more than
predicter of legal consequences. His
duty to society as well as to his
20
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client involves many relevant social,
economic, political, and philosophi-
cal considerations. And the privi-
lege of nondisclosure is not lost
merely because relevant nonlegal
considerations are expressly stated
in a communication which also in-
cludes legal advice." United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89
F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
If predominantly legal advice is
sought or given, the fact that busi-
ness advice is also contained in the
communication should not affect
the privilege. But where a com-
munication neither invited nor ex-
pressed any legal opinion, or where
the advice sought or given is
largely of a business nature, the
communication will not be pro-
tected. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Ra-
dio Corporation of America, 121 F.
Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954).
House Counsel
It has been suggested that the
privilege should not apply when
house counsel are involved. Wise
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
36 Del. (6 Harr.) 456, 178 A. 640
(1935).
An argument can be made for
the proposition that no incentive to
disclosure is needed when the at-
torney is himself an officer of the
corporation. However, it seems
probable that there would be much
greater reluctance in confiding in
house counsel if there were no
privilege. The need for frequent
advice of counsel who is readily
accessible provides a cogent reason
for encouraging the use of house
counsel.
The fact that house counsel are
paid annual salaries, occupy the cor-
poration's buildings, are employees
rather than independent contrac-
tors, and give advice to one regular
client rather than a number of
clients are not significant distin-
guishing characteristics insofar as
the availability of the privilege is
concerned. Consequently, the courts
have refused to deny categorically
the availability of the privilege to
the corporation-house counsel com-
munication. See, e.g., United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
above; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio
Corporation of America, above;
American Cyanamid Co. v. Her-
cules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85
(D. Del. 1962).
FUNCTION TEST
Whether the privilege applies to
a communication to or from house
counsel should depend primarily
upon the function performed by the
attorney in gathering or preparing
the material in question. The sug-
gestion has been made that whether
a lawyer could receive a privileged
communication depends on the rel-
ative amount of time spent in the
role of attorney as compared to the
amount of time spent in business
affairs. American Cyanamid Co. v.
Hercules Powder Co., above.
A preferable approach would ex-
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amine the function he performed
with reference to each individual
communication, appreciating that a
lawyer who spends most of his time
giving business advice may be con-
sulted on some matters solely for
legal assistance.
ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS
Several distinguished commenta-
tors have made some cogent sugges-
tions of administrative techniques
to minimize the danger that the
privilege would not protect com-
munication to and from house
counsel. Haight, Keeping the Privi-
lege Inside the Corporation, 18 Bus.
LAW. 551 (1963); Maurer, Privi-
leged Communications and the Cor-
porate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW. 352,
385 (1967); Burnham, Confidential-
ity and the Corporate Lawyer, 56
ILL. BAR J. 542, 543-44 (1968); Hein-
inger, The Attorney-Client Privilege
as It Relates to Corporations, 53 ILL.
BAR J. 376, 383-84 (1965).
Their suggestions are consolidat-
ed into the following list:
* Place legal responsibility of the
corporation under one person. Pat-
ent counsel, tax counsel, claims
counsel, and others in organiza-
tional responsibility should be un-
der the supervision of the chief
legal attorney.
" Use legal titles for legal personnel.
* Adopt special law department
stationery, separate from company's
business stationery.
* Distinguish legal from business
advice and label legal advice by an
appropriate legend.
e Be careful of sequence. Channel
reports directly between the legal
department and the appropriate cor-
porate executive-not indirectly.
* Segregate law department files
and office files. Confidential com-
munications should not be main-
tained in general files.
* Communicate to as few persons
as possible. Corporate conferences
at which confidential communica-
tion or legal advice is sought should
be limited to necessary personnel
who have a high degree of respon-
sibility for the subject matter.
o Where possible, each legal com-
munication should be set up to deal
with a single legal problem, pref-
erably with facts and business
problems set up and predicated for
legal conclusions.
o Beware of the copying machine.
Thomas Austern goes so far as to
recommend that the original be
marked "Legal Opinion-Not To
Be Copied-Return to Legal Divi-
sion." Austern, Corporate Counsel
Communication: Is Anybody Lis-
tening? 17 Bus. LAW. 868, 871
(1962).
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* Adopt and enforce record reten-
tion schedules. Mr. Austern sug-
gests the adoption of "an acceler-
ated program of document disposi-
tions." He suggests that the rule
should be that "in a documentary
garden, an annual is not a peren-
nial." Ibid.
9 Where possible, have attorneys
admitted to local bar. Nonmember-
ship has been held "highly proba-
tive" of the absence of the privi-
lege. American Cyanamid Co. v.
Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp.
85 (D. Del. 1962).
CHANGING ATTITUDES
These matters have not been the
subject of as extensive litigation
during the last few years as during
the 1962-1964 period. The problem
area has shifted to the issue dis-
cussed in the following section by
Mr. Brereton.
The problems alluded to above
cannot be answered by a formula.
There is the constant conflict be-
tween the policy that seeks to ascer-
tain the truth and that which en-
courages the use of legal advice
through the device of the privilege.
The more deeply one is convinced
of the social necessity of permitting
corporations to consult frankly and
privately with legal advisers, the
more willing one should be to ac-
cord them a flexible and generous
privilege. Simon, The Attorney-
Client Privilege as Applied to Cor-
porations, 65 YALE L. J. 953, 990
(1956). The more convinced one
is that the privilege is being used
as a shield by the corporation to pre-
clude access to the truth by immu-
nizing vast quantities of relevant
evidence, the more restrictive will
be the interpretation given to the
privilege.
In the long run, a different atti-
tude may be demonstrated in the
"private" cases involving routine
discovery than in the "public" cases
involving government regulation.
Only time will tell.
In these days of business ascendency, many large corporations
have their own staffs of "house counsel"; and the professional status
of the lawyer acquires fuzzy edges as he takes his place on the
company's payroll with other employees.
BERYL HAROLD LEvY, CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR
SINNER? 9 (Chilton Co., Philadelphia, Pa. 1961).
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